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B.: The Inadequate Award in West Virginia

STUDENT NOTES
TBE

INADEQUATE AwAR

IN WEST VmGnIA

Actions involving personal injuries constitute a great majority
of the cases placed on trial dockets in courts throughout the country.1 Due to the ever increasing number of automobiles being
operated on the highways, it is only natural that a majority of all
personal injury cases involve actions based on the negligent operation of these vehicles. In each of these cases the plaintiff is alleging
that an injury or injuries has been inflicted upon him as a result
of this negligence, and his sole objective is to recover money damages as compensation therefor.
"In theory personal injury damage law attempts to do two
things: (1) put the plaintiff in the same financial condition he
would have been in had he not been injured, and (2) award him
sums of money as compensation for his past and future mental and
physical pain and suffering."2
This statement is of the greatest importance, and the theories
which it expounds should be kept foremost in mind throughout this
article. It should be constantly remembered that the reason for
awarding damages is an effort to return the plaintiff to the status
quo; not to "give" him great sums of money to which he may not
be entitled, but on the other hand to award him every penny which
is owed him by the defendant by reason of the injury inflicted.3
This concept is of course not a new one. Almost two thousand
years ago these same rules were set forth in the greatest book of
laws ever compiled: "eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand,
foot for foot;" 4 "if a man dig a pit and not cover it and an ox or
an ass fall therein, the owner of the pit shall make it good and give
money unto the owner of them and the dead beast shall be his."5
The question of the proper amount of damages in personal
injury actions has of late been afforded a prominent role. This is
due largely to the relatively recent increase in the size of personal
injury awards in many parts of the country.6 This increase has
1

Ross, Damages for PersonalInjury and Wrongful Death, 27 Miss. L.J. 92

(1956).
2

Daniels, Measure of Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 7 MiAzu L.Q.
171 (1952).
3 Fleming, Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582
(1956).
4 Exodus 21:23.
6GExodus 21:33-34.
Snow, The Defense Cannot Rest, 1 D.L.J. 3 (1957).
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been the cause for some great alarm to certain groups of persons 7notably those lawyers who represent insurance companies, and the
companies themselves. It may be of some interest to all lawyers
in our state to examine the pertinent West Virginia cases in an effort
to determine how personal injury verdicts during the last 13 years
in our state compare (1) with those of past years, and (2) with
those in other states.
There are generally three major groups or persons involved in
the plaintiff's attempt to obtain a satisfactory recovery in a personal
injury action: (1) the jury, (2) the trial judge, and (3) the appellate court. Each of these plays a distinct and important role in the
recovery process, and each has a reasonably definite duty which
must be discharged. Whether or not these duties are being properly
performed is the issue under discussion.
In general, juries in circuit courts in West Virginia do not
return verdicts of a sufficient amount to compensate the plaintiff
for the injuries which have been inflicted upon him by the negligent
act of the defendant. This statement and other conclusions herein,
are necessarily based only on those cases reported in the West Virginia Reports, including all major reported personal injury cases in
our state, as well as all reported personal injury cases in West Virginia from 1945 to January, 1958.
The largest reported jury verdict in a personal injury case from
a circuit court in West Virginia is $93,800, rendered in Brewer v.
Appalachian ConstructionCo.8 This verdict represents a great deal
of money, but in order to determine its adequacy examine briefly
the injuries suffered. Plaintiff was 49 years of age with a life expectancy of 20.6 years; following an explosion it took a four-hour
operation to remove glass from his face, neck, and eye, requiring
144 stitches; his right eye was removed; the ulnar nerve was severed;
most of the function of his right arm was lost; two other operations
were later required; plaintiff suffers from fainting, sleeplessness and
nausea; his wife must dress, bathe and shave him. His average
yearly earning capacity before the injury was $3,168.35. In the
light of these facts the jury verdict does not represent such a staggering amount. As a matter of fact there would appear to be considerable evidence here on which to base a proper objection to this
verdict as being inadequate.
7 Pierson, The True Adequate Award, 1 D.L.J. 275 (1957); Editorial,

8 D.L.J. v (1957).
8 138 W. Va. 487, 76 S.E.2d 916 (1953).
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Compare this verdict with one rendered in Miami, Florida, for
$800,0009 where the injury suffered was the partial loss of one
foot, with other rather serious consequences resulting therefrom.
Compare also the case of a nine year old boy who lost both legs,
suffered burns over most of his body, and received other injuries.
The jury verdict, believed to be the largest single personal injury
verdict in history, was a compensating $750,000.00.1o Another
recent "largest" verdict to be compared with the five figure award
in the Brewer case is an unreported Oklahoma award made in
Edwards v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. The recovery was $650,000.0011 Other verdicts, not quite as substantial as this, but much
larger than that which the jury returned in the Brewer case have
been rendered in other states. 12
It is not contended that the largest verdict in our state is the
smallest top award of any of the states, 13 but in view of the last
four cited cases it is apparent that although the injuries suffered
by the plaintiff in the Brewer case were probably as severe as those
suffered in the other three cases, the jury in the West Virginia case
did not render an adequate award either in comparison to those
in the other states or in view of the serious injuries suffered.
In discussing the adequacy of jury action in personal injury
cases in West Virginia more specifically, the following cases are in
point. A head injury to a laborer who was in bed for three weeks
and unable to do the hard labor he could perform previously was
worth $10,000 in 1928.14 In Goshorn v. Wheeling Mold & Foundry
Co.,15 the plaintiff, a thirty-five year old worker making thirty cents
an hour, received a verdict of $16,777.75, for the loss of an arm.
This verdict was affirmed by the supreme court, although recognized to be the largest verdict ever rendered at the time by a jury
in this state for a like or similar injury.
9

Wilson v. Florida East Coast By., 67 So. 2d 185 (1953). See 3 BELLi,
TRILs 2361 (1954).
10 Finn v. Commonwealth Edison Co. & Northern Illinois Gas Co., Superior
Court, Cook Co., Illinois, before a jury, July 2, 1957. See also 20 NACCA L.J.
898 (1957).
11 See Marts Worth, Time, April 28, 1958, p. 22.
12 For an excellent discussion of a $420,000 verdict rendered in Maynard v.
Milwaukee Rys., (unreported) see 13 NACCA L.J. 290 (1953). See also
volumes 1-20 NACCA L.J., Verdicts or Awards Exceeding $50,000, for an
extensive compilation of jury verdicts approaching the adequate award.
13 Belli, Verdicts or Awards Exceeding $50,000, 2 NACCA L.J. 182 (1948).
14 Webb v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 105 W. Va. 555, 144 S.E. 100 (1928).
15 65 W. Va. 250, 64 S.E. 22 (1909).
MODmEm
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It is important to keep in mind that the actual worth or purchasing power of a dollar between 1900 and 1930 was considerably
greater than it is today, and that this decrease to present value may
properly be taken into account by the jury in reaching their verdict. 16 "It is not the number of dollars, but the value of the dollars
that counts."1 7 It has been estimated that in order to make an accurate comparison of verdicts rendered prior to World War II with
those rendered since 1940, a period of extreme inflation, the earlier
verdicts must be at least doubled.' 8 The verdict in the Goshorn
case would therefore be represented by a verdict of at least $33,555.50 if rendered today.
An even better example is the case of Kirk v. Virginian Ry., 19
in which the plaintiff, a forty-five year old male earning between
$2200 and $2500 a year received a verdict of $45,000. To compensate for the decreased value of the dollar since that date, a jury
today would have to return a verdict of over $90,000.20 It is submitted that it would be almost impossible to obtain such an award
today in West Virginia for the type of injury suffered in the Goshorn
case, although it is further submitted that such a verdict in a particular case might well be warranted. Perhaps this much of an
increase is more than can be expected, but it is almost appalling
to note -that since the Kirk case not only has there been no reasonable increase in verdicts for the loss of a limb to compensate for
the increased cost of living, but that the highest verdict since the
Kirk case for a similar injury was $23,416.00.21
A brief examination of several West Virginia cases will indicate
that considering the actual worth of the award in terms of purchasing power, a plaintiff would be in a more compensated financial
position if injured in West Virginia twenty to twenty-five years ago
rather than today. It should be remembered that during the past ten
or fifteen years verdicts in other states have been increasing, thereby
keeping pace to some extent with the diminishing value of the
award and therefore making the award more adequate.
262 (1926).
l 7 Barnett, The Adequate Award in Mississippi, 25 Miss. L.J. 244, 245
16 Looney v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 102 W. Va. 40, 135 S.E.

(1953).

See also Kircher v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 195 P.2d 427 (1948).
19
105
W.
Va. 335, 142 S.E. 434 (1928).
20
Newsweek, April 14, 1958, p. 95. The National Industrial Conference
Board reports that in order to have the same buying power today after taxes
as a man earning $25,000 in 1939, requires an income of $69,991.00.
21 Peck v. Bez, 129 W. Va. 247, 40 S.E.2d 1 (1946).
18 Ibid.
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The loss of a leg was compensated by an award of only $20,000.00 to a fourteen year old boy who aspired to be a farmer;22 the
loss of the use of an arm to a forty-four year old worker, $9,000.0023; the loss of both legs above the knees plus other severe
injuries was believed by the jury to be compensated by a $40,000.00
verdict, 24 while in a California case a jury found no less than
$60,000 to be just compensation for the loss of one hand.2 5 And
as late as 1949, a West Virginia jury believed that a verdict of
$7,500.00 was sufficient compensation for the loss of a testicle, suffered by a five year old boy, with all the attendant pain, suffering
and injury involved.2 6 It should be noted perhaps that not all juries
in the period prior to 1930 were as generous as the few noted, as
evidenced by a verdict of $475.00 for a nine year old boy who
27
suffered a permanent injury to his arm.
Other 'large" verdicts (in comparison to others rendered in
our state) prior to 1940, include a $30,000 verdict to a thirty-one
year old man, earning $1500.00 a year, with a life expectancy of thirty-six years-the injury: loss of both an arm and a leg;2 8 a verdict
29
of $50,000 to a six year old boy for the loss of an arm and a leg;
and a verdict of $25,000 to a nineteen year old female for the loss
of an eye and other very serious and disfiguring injuries.8 0
From the verdicts rendered in the above cited cases, it is
apparent that with the slight exception of the Brewer case, in "actual" dollar worth, jury verdicts in West Virginia since 1940 have
in many instances been much lower than those awarded for comparable injuries prior to 1940, even though the cost of living, medical expenses, doctor bills, nursing care and everything else has risen
to a present all-time high.81 The reason for this difference in jury
attitude is not known to this writer. It would apparently have no
22
Jones v. Ambrose, 128 W. Va. 715, 38 S.E.2d
23
Ellis v. Henderson, 95 S.E.2d 801 (1957).
24
Humphrey v. Virginian Ry., 132 W. Va. 250,
25

Kircher v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., supra.

263 (1946).
54 S.E.2d 204 (1948).

26Ross
v. White, 133 W. Va. 1, 54 S.E.2d 8 (1949).
2
7 Parsons v. County Court of Roane County, 92 W. Va. 490, 115 S.E. 478
(1922). For similar cases and courts' discussion thereon see Jordan v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 135 W. Va. 183, 62 S.E.2d 806 (1950); Werle v. Wheeling
Traction Co., 85 W. Va. 398, 102 S.E. 289 (1920). See also Freid v. N.Y.,
N.H. 28
& H.R.R. 228 N.Y. 211, 127 N.E. 913 (1918).
Dumphy v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 82 W. Va. 123, 95 S.E. 863 (1918).
29
Vest v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 117 W. Va. 457, 187 S.E. 358 (1936).
3o Morris v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 107 W. Va. 181, 147 S.E. 759 (1929).
al See Cost of Living Index, April, 1958; U.S. News & World Report,
April 25, 1958, p. 95.
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logical basis or explanation. Suffice it to say that it is an unfortunate
economic fact.
Since 1945, a period of thirteen years, there are reported in
West Virginia only 17 cases in which the jury returned a verdict for
over $10,000. This compilation includes not only those cases in
which the issue as to the size of the verdict was raised in the
supreme court, but also all reported cases during that period in
which the amount of the verdict was mentioned. It is admitted
that no doubt there have been numerous other five-figure verdicts
rendered by juries during that period; but, excluding death cases
as this article does, and in view of the record of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in reversing verdicts of this size, as will
be discussed later, it is believed that the seventeen cases do represent a large proportion of the five-figure verdicts rendered through32
out the state during this period.
These verdicts include: a $10,500 recovery for a compression
fracture of the first lumbar vertebrae with sixteen days hospitalization, a heavy cast on the back and neck, then a lighter brace
and loss of earnings and property damage; 33 a $15,000 recovery by
a seven year old boy for a fractured leg, a five degree shortening of
the leg, three weeks hospitalization and a permanent scar on his
knee; 34 and a $30,000 recovery for a fractured pelvis, compound
fracture of the leg, several operations of the right leg, failure of the
bone in the leg to unite properly, multiple contusions on the body
and inability to work. 35
Of the seventeen cases just cited, it is interesting to note that
thirteen of them were reversed by the supreme court; three because
the damages were excessive, ten on other grounds, with no dis32

During a comparable period, 1940-1954, unreported California cases

showed 47 verdicts of $50,000 or more; 28 verdicts of $100,000 or more;
7 verdicts of $200,000 or more; and 3 verdicts of $300,000 or more. 8 BELL!,
MODERN
T~rAIs 2349-2359.
33

Somerville v. Dellosa, 183 W. Va. 485, 56 S.E.2d 756 (1949).
Watson v. Woodall, 134 W. Va. 787, 61 S.E.2d 747 (1950).
35 Matthews v. Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co., 188 W. Va. 639, 77
S.E.2d 180 (1958). See also Gray v. Wright, 96 S.E.2d 671 (W. Va. 1957);
Puffer v. Hub Cigar Store, 140 W. Va. 327, 84 S.E.2d 145 (1954); Brewer v.
Appalachian Construction Co., supra; Jordan v. Baltimore & Ohio ThR., 135
W. Va. 183, 62 S.E.2d. 806 (1950); Konopka v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
34

133 W. Va. 775, 58 S.E. 128 (1950); Humphrey v. Virginian Ry., supra; Pritt v.
West Virginian Northern R.R., 132 W. Va. 184, 51 S.E.2d 105 (1948); French

v. Sinkford, 132 W. Va. 66, 54 S.E.2d 88 (1948); O'Flaherty v. Tarrou, 130

W. Va. 826, 48 S.E.2d 392 (1947); Jones v. Ambrose, supra; Hutchinson v.
Montgomery Memorial Park Corp., 128 W. Va. 419, 86 S.E.2d 889 (1945).
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cussion of the amount of the verdict in nine of these. Of the four
cases affirmed, only two discussed the verdict and specifically held
it not to be excessive.
At this point therefore, the following conclusions appear to
be inescapable, based on all of the foregoing facts: (1) jury verdicts in the United States are generally higher, as is practically
everything else, than they were twenty years ago, (2) jury verdicts
in West Virginia have not kept pace with this general increase,
and have not been commensurate in most cases either with the
injury in question or with the relatively constant decreasing value
of the dollar.
The jury has a sworn duty to hear the testimony, arguments
and instructions and determine liability therefrom.3 6 Once the question of liability has been decided in favor of the plaintiff, no matter
how close the question may have been, that issue should be erased
from the juror's mind and a determined attempt made to compensate the plaintiff for all the losses he has incurred and will incur.
The jury must consider a number of items in arriving at the
size of their award. A serious question can be raised as to whether
or not the following elements have been afforded proper consideration by West Virginia juries. "The elements generally allowed to
enter into the amount of damages are the character of the'employment, the earning powers of the employee, his age, and previous
physical health and condition, and often his prospects for future
advancement in his trade or calling... . with something added for

mental and physical pain suffered and to be endured and for loss
of time, and the costs and expense of being cured." 7
It is submitted that from the afore-cited cases, with few exceptions, the juries in West Virginia have not met this responsibility
in a manner which could be considered as furnishing adequate
compensation to the injured plaintiff.
The reasons for this reluctance by the jury to return an adequate award are unknown. A partial explanation may lie in the
assertion that there is a tendency for juries in more rural circuits
in this state and in our less populated towns to return verdicts in
smaller amounts. Perhaps this is proper in view of the allegations
that a dollar is worth more in a rural community than it is in a
50, art. 7, § 14 (Michie 1955).
ST Dumphy v. Norfolk & Western Ry., supra note 28.
36W. VA. CoDE C.
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large city. 8 But query: is the loss of an arm worth more to a
man. in New York than it is to a man in West Virginia, the same
age, earning the same amount? Do injured persons in Miami, or Chicago, or San Francisco suffer more intense pain than a person similarly injured in Morgantown or Williamson? Is a scarred face or a
crippled body more subject to ridicule in Detroit or Dallas than it
is in Charleston or Wheeling? 9
The argument, therefore, that "the smaller the town the smaller
the verdict should be", is neither based on, nor can it be defended
on any reasonable basis when dealing with the amount of damages
to be awarded for pain and suffering.
The question of how much money to award a plaintiff for past
and future physical and mental pain, suffering and inconvenience
is a vital issue which must be considered most carefully by the jury
since the plaintiff is forced to recover all the damages he will ever
be entitled to in this one action. It appears, however, that in assessing the amount recoverable for this proper element of damages,
the juries in West Virginia have been in many cases unreasonable in
their pitifully inadequate awards. The following cases attest to
this apparent lack of understanding the true value of human worth.
The largest jury award in West Virginia attributed to pain,
40
suffering and inconvenience was $30,296.30 in the Brewer case.
Compare this amount with a $40,000 award for pain and suffering
in a New York case; 4 1 a $40,000 award for eleven hours of conscious
pain and suffering; 42 and $20,000 for twenty minutes of conscious
pain and suffering.48 See also the case of Bartlebaugh v. Pennsylvania R.R., 44 where the court approved a verdict which included
45
$92,383 for claimed damages other than loss af earnings.
A disgraceful example of our jury's unrealistic and almost inhuman approach to this problem is found in Billy v. Powell,4 6 in
38 Pierson, supra note 7, at 278. See Bowman v. Illinois Central
9 ill.3App. 2d 182, 132 N.E.2d 558 (1956).
9 See Daniels, supra note 2.

R.R.,

40 This award was held excessive by the West Virginia Supreme Court.
41 McKinney v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 57 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
42
Naylor v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 187 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1951). See 8
NACCA L.J. 135 (1951).
43 Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 256 P.2d 603 (Calif. 1953).

44 150 Ohio St. 887, 82 N.E.2d 853 (1948).

45 For comparative West Virginia cases see e.g., Isabella v. West Virginia
Transportation Co., 132 W. Va. 85, 51 S.E.2d 318 (1918); Kelly v. Checker
White Cab Inc., 131 W. Va. 816, 50 S.E.2d 888 (1948); Elswick v. Charleston
Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 241, 436 S.E.2d 419 (1946).

46 183 W. Va. 278, 55 S.E.2d 889 (1949).
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which the plaintiff suffered a broken neck, was hospitalized eightyone days, wore a cast from his hips to the top of his head, and had
to have his head held up off his shoulders by pins inserted into his
skull and tied to ropes secured to the ceiling. His hospital expense
was $1,652.00. The recovery was an unbelievably low $3,000, or a
maximum of $1,348.00 for all of the attendant pain and suffering
involved. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that
the injuries were such as would sustain the amount of the verdict.
As one judge has pointed out in reference to evaluating pain
and suffering: "The verdict in a case like this is at best a feeble
attempt to place the injured person back in the shoes he wore
before the injury. In many cases... it cannot be done. ... The ele-

ments that enter into a judgment like this are so diverse that it
often requires more of humility than it does of law properly to
assess them."47

It is submitted that the juries in West Virginia have indeed
made a "feeble attempt" to assess adequately these damages in
most of the cases cited herein; and further that in the few cases in
which reasonable awards for pain and suffering have been made
by juries, our supreme court has not always given adequate recognition to this proper element of damages and has often refused to
sustain the adequate result which is infrequently reached by the
48
triers of fact.
It should be noted that injured plaintiffs receive somewhat
more compensating treatment by juries in the federal courts in our
state. The following verdicts and awards have been noted: $177,000; 49 $160,000;5 0 and $140,000.51 The injuries in all of these federal
cases were extremely severe; and while the jury verdict was not
always the ultimate amount received by the plaintiffs, those amounts
at least represent a more successful attempt to return a more ade47
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hargrove, 160 Fla. 405, 35 So. 2d 1
(1948). See Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REv.

27 (1955).
48
See cases cited infra under the discussion of the duty of the appellate

court when reviewing a personal injury award.
49 Schefflin v. Indianapolis-Kansas City Motor Freight Co. (unreported)

(1953). See Belli, Verdicts or Awards Exceeding $50,000, 12 NACCA L.J.
270, 331 (1953).

Go Armentrout v. Virginian Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997 (S.D.W. Va. 1947),
reversed because of excessiveness, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1947). See Comment,
33 IowA L. REv. 576 (1948); Comment, 16 U. KAN. Crry L. REV. 44 (1947).
51 Douglas v. Morrison-Knudson Co. & Ralph E. Mills Co. (unreported)
(S.D.W. Va. 1953). See Belli, Verdicts or Awards Exceeding $50,000,

13 NACCA L.J. 283 (1953).
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quate award to the injured plaintiffs than awards made by juries
in our state circuit courts.
It would appear from all of these cases that West Virginia is
not one of the states that have been allegedly taken over by members of the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys who have been accused of "fomenting 'excessiveness'
in verdicts to the point of creating a "Frankenstein which one
day will take the form of legislation similar in concept to the
52
Workmen's Compensation statutes."
As a matter of fact, it would appear that even without the
presence of a horde of "NACCA" attorneys, West Virginia verdicts
unfortunately are in fact at present fairly comparable to those
53
amounts awarded under our workmen's compensation statute.
Since a conflict between plaintiff's attorneys and insurance
company lawyers is inevitable in discussing the problem of adequate jmy verdicts, perhaps it would be proper at this point to
briefly inquire as to whether or not verdicts in this country are
actually excessive at present to the point of endangering the continued edstence of the entire liability insurance industry.
There is no better source in point than the facts compiled and
statements made by the insurance attorneys themselves. For example, during 1954 and 1955, the defendant prevailed in 57.5% of all
cases tried; the percentage rising in 1956 to 58.5%.5 4 There is also
a statement by an insurance attorney that "research indicates that
the day of the exorbitant verdict is passing."5 5 And perhaps the
most notable fact of all, is that although 40,000 people were killed
and 2,368,000 people were injured in automobile accidents during
1956, the NACCA Law Journal, which lists all reported and available unreported cases and settlements over $50,000, reported only
four cases in that year in which verdicts of over $100,000 were
56
secured, and all four of these were reversed.
With the exception of a few extraordinary cases, some of which
have been noted herein, jury verdicts in general, and in particular
in West Virginia, have not increased to the point where we are
on the brink of being forced to rely on socialized insurance for liability protection.
52 Pierson, supra note 7. at 276.
53
54 W. VA. CODE c. 2, art. 4, § 6 (Michie 1955).
55
56

Snow, supra note 6.
Pierson, supra note 7.
Pierson, The True Adequate Award, 2 D.L.J. 347 (1957).
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If these increased verdicts alone have put the liability insurance
companies in a truly precarious financial position, then perhaps
measures should be taken to scrutinize more carefully their weakened financial status by proper state officials; or else in an effort to
alleviate this financial distress, perhaps their already privileged income tax rate should be further reduced or excluded altogether. It
is evident without question that if a man receives a just $100,000
verdict for his injuries he should not be penalized by having to
return half or any of his award in an effort to reduce insurance
premiums or increase insurance policyholder's dividends. He is
entitled to compensation for his injuries; and juries, who are led to
believe by "information campaigns," or who base the amount of
their verdict on a basis, not of compensating an injured human
being, but of keeping their premiums at a lower rate, are violating
57
their duty in the most flagrant manner.
As stated, it has been alleged that insurance companies were
forced to raise their premiums in some parts of the country as a
direct result of excessive verdicts in those areas.5 8 The limitations
of this article prohibit an examination to determine whether insurance premiums remained at a constant rate in these areas from
1925 to 1940, the alleged birthdate of the high verdict era. From
an examination of the verdicts in West Virginia during the last
thirteen years, surely there were no increases in liability premiums
in our state for the reason that such were necessitated by the awarding of excessive verdicts. If there were in fact such increases in
premiums, they must have been required by other economic factors. It might be interesting to note that in those cases where
insurance company attorneys received six-figure jury verdicts for
their own personal injuries, or for those of their clients when representing a plaintiff, no case has been found through diligent research in which there was a voluntary remittitur offered in an effort
to reduce insurance premiums or for any other reason. 59
As mentioned earlier, the reason for awarding damages to an
injured plaintiff is to make him whole for the wrong which he has
suffered. "A man is entitled to his limbs as nature gave them to him
and with their natural strength."60 Therefore, while a plaintiff's
5

7 Belli, supra note 49, at 264.

58 Snow, supra note 6.
59

BeRi, Verdicts or Awards Exceeding $50,000, 11 NACCA L.J. 228

(1958).
60 See also note 49 supra.
Carter, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injuries or Death in the
Courts of the Common-Law Provinces, 32 CAx. B. Ruv. 713 (1954).
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attorney is attempting to obtain a verdict to which he believes his
client is entitled-whether it be one for $1,000 or $100,000-the
defense attorney should not accuse his opponent of trying to destroy
the financial structure of our nation by asking for too much,0 ' and
at the same time base his defense on the application of the following standard suggested by an insurance company counsel: "We
should lower or raise our evaluation [of a settlement] in accordance
with personality, intelligence, personal appearance and character
of the claimant. . . . Race, color and creed are touchy subjects
but should, nevertheless, be considered. . . . With respect to the

question of whether to settle or try a case, the answer is relatively
simple, and that is: 'Can we save or make any money by trying
the case.'" 62 Is it terribly naive to ask whether or not there is a
place reserved for an honest appraisal of the injury suffered by the
plaintiff, regardless of what amount the jury or court may be expected to return or approve in a particular state or locale? Perhaps
the answer is found in the fact that each side has a duty to his
client which should be performed as well as possible in the client's
interest. If this is true, then neither the plaintiff's attorney nor defendant's attorney has any right arbitrarily to accuse the other of
trying to cheat one side out of a just award, or the other side of
fomenting the economic destruction of our country.
If a plaintiff is fortunate enough to obtain a jury verdict in the
first instance, and if this verdict should appear to be reasonably
adequate, the next obstacle in the road to compensation is the trial
judge who plays an exceedingly important role in the recovery
process. "A person who comes to an appellate court with a verdict
of a jury approved6 by the trial court, is in the strongest position
known to the law." 3
The trial judge is in a position to see the witnesses, understand
the facts and observe the character of the jurors. 64 For these reasons, mere approval by the trial judge of the jury verdict is given
"due weight and consideration in the appellate court;" 65 and on
the other hand, "a verdict which has been disapproved by the trial
judge is not entitled to the same weight as one which the trial
judge has permitted to stand." 66 And a statement by the trial judge
61 Pierson,

supra note 56.

62Smith, Evaluating Case-Settlement or Trial, 1 D.L.J. 71, 85 (1957).
63 Waddell v. New River Co., 93 S.E.2d 478 (W. Va. 1956).
64 See Goshorn v. Wheeling Mold & Foundry Co., supra note 15.
65 Yuncke v. Welker, 128 W. Va. 299,309, 36 S.E.2d 410 (1946).
66 Browning v. Monongahela Transport Co., 126 W. Va. 195, 27 S.E.2d
481 (1948).
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that "had he been on the jury he would have been inclined to vote
for the amount which it found in its verdict," is given great weight
by the appellate court, 67 although a judge's personal view as to the
excessiveness of the verdict is not a sufficient ground for his setting
68
it aside.
In acting on a jury verdict, the trial court has some discretion,
but it is confined within very narrow limits; and to warrant setting
aside a verdict, the trial 69court must be convinced that improper
motives affected the jury.
If more adequate verdicts are to be obtained in West Virginia
in the future, it is submitted that the plaintiff's attorney should
devote more and more attention to the trial judge in an effort properly to convince him as well as the jury of the seriousness of the
plaintiff's injuries. For once a definite inroad is made into the
present miserly antiquated awards which are being rendered as
compensation for modem injuries and living standards, and a trial
judge will consistently affirm these larger verdicts, then the supreme
court may more readily and sympathetically take cognizance of the
poor plaintiff's predicament and realize that jury verdicts are a
part of the economic structure of our nation and therefore must be
equal to the other economic conditions with which the plaintiff must
exist.
The trial judge, therefore, is a very important factor to the
plaintiff after a favorable jury verdict has been returned. The plaintiffs chances for an ultimate affirmance of the verdict70 clearly depend to a great extent on the action of the trial court.
The next obstacle confronting the plaintiff is the appellate
court. The difficulty which the plaintiff encounters in obtaining
an adequate jury award has heretofore been indicated. At this point,
assuming a verdict in his favor, the plaintiff is now faced with the
task of trying to keep it. Cases already7 cited have indicated that
this is often more than a difficult task. '
It must be conceded, however, that in reviewing a jury verdict
on the question of excessiveness, the appellate court also has a diffi67Bowling v. Guyan Lumber Co., 105 W. Va.
& Ohio Ry., supra note 29.

(192.8).
6s Vest v. Chesapeake
69

(1916).

309, 310, 143 S.E. 86

Hodge v. Charleston Interurban R.R., 79 W. Va. 174, 90 S.E. 601

70 Belli, The Chancellors Foot, 18 NACCA
71 See note 35 supra.

LJ.401 (1956).
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cult problem. "No question is ever presented, either to a trial court
or to an appellate court, more difficult of determination than this.
. . .,,72 "It is never easy to determine in a particular case where
the province of a jury ends and that of a court begins on a
73
question of fact."
There are various general rules which are utilized and applied
by our Supreme Court of Appeals in reviewing a jury's damage
verdict. The basic rule from which all others have been formulated
when appropriate is that the question of damages is one of factual
determination within the exclusive province of the jury.74 For this
reason, therefore, the appellate court cannot interfere with the
jury's finding of damages, which is conclusive, 75 unless, and this
"unless" has left many injured plaintiffs, who proved liability and
damages to the satisfaction of twelve jurymen, little or nothing to
show for their unfortunate encounter with a negligent defendant
but a broken body, the appellate court decides that the amount
awarded by the jury indicates that the verdict is the result of "paror lack of due contiality, prejudice or misconduct,"76 sympathy
79
8
sideration, 1 bias, mistake7 or fraud.
There can be no doubt but that the appellate court does possess
the power to reverse a jury verdict where any of these reasons are
clearly and unmistakenly evident, but this authority may not be
exercised arbitrarily. 80 Nor is it proper for the appellate court to
substitute its judgment for that of the jury in the absence of any
of the aforestated grounds for reversal, 8 1 although there appears to
be considerable belief that this is nevertheless done all too frequently
in direct contradiction to every basic rule of law regarding the
province of the jury in dealing with such matter. 82 Judge Haymond
in Raines v. Faulkner,88 correctly stated the applicable rule and
72 Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. v. Arrington, 126 Va. 194, 101 S.E. 415 (1919).
73 Waddell. v. New River Co., supra note 63.

74 Trushel v. Rex Amusement Co., 102 W. Va. 215, 136 S.E. 30 (1927);
Pollock v. Wheeling Traction Co., 83 W. Va. 768, 99 S.E. 267 (1919).
75 Trice v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 40 W. Va. 271, 21 S.E. 1022 (1895).
76 Bowling v. Guyan Lumber Co., supra note 67.
77

Brewer v. Appalachian Construction Co., supra note 8.
78 Snodgrass v. Charleston NuGrape Co., 113 W. Va. 748, 169 S.E. 406
(1933); French v. Sinkford, 132 W. Va. 66, 54 S.E.2d 38 (1948).
7 9 Werle v. Wheeling Traction Co., 82 W. Va. 398, 102 S.E. 289 (1920).
BOYuncke v. Welker, supra note 65; see Palmquist, An Inadequate Award,
L.J. 324 (1954).
25 . Miss.
81 Bailey v. DeBoyd and Service Storage & Transfer Co., 135 W. Va. 730,
65 S.E.2d 82 (1951).
82 See Note, 1 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 23 (1952); Carter, supra note 60.
8
3 Raines v. Faulkner, 131 W. Va. 10, 29, 48 S.E.2d 393 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
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the reason supporting it,believing that it had been violated in
that case. "Neither am I willing to substitute any personal view
of my own, based solely upon a printed record, for that of the jury
which observed the witnesses and heard them testify."
With these rules in mind, examine some of the decisions of
our Supreme Court of Appeals on the question of excessiveness of
damages. During the period between 1945 and January, 1958, our
court examined the decisions of 63 personal injury cases in which
the plaintiff had received a verdict by the jury. Of these cases, the
issue of excessiveness was raised and dealt with in 23 cases. Of
these cases, 8 verdicts were held to be excessive, and 15 verdicts
held not to be excessive. Of the cases in this last mentioned group,
3 cases were nevertheless reversed on other grounds.
It may be of some interest to note that of all the 63 cases
examined, 85 were reversed for one reason or another. This fact
would indicate that even if a 'large" verdict of $50,000 or
more was affirmed once in awhile, the average verdict of all personal
injury cases tried in which the plaintiff actually recovers the amount
awarded would not be so large, for example as to abolish all monetary returns to liability company policy-holders. In support of this
statement these facts are pertinent: the average verdict in West
Virginia during the period 1945 to 1958, of all personal injury cases
affirmed by our court was $8,677.80; and the average verdict of all
personal injury cases examined during the thirteen year period was
only $9,518.97.
It has been stated that there is little consistency in the action
of juries in personal injury cases, and little more in decisions of
courts on the question of damages.8 4 The general reason for this
situation may be that generally the courts apply the rule that each
case must stand on its own merits, on the ground that verdicts in
other cases "furnish no reliable index as to the amount of damages
which should be properly allowed."8 5
A brief examination of some of the personal injury cases reported during 1945 to 1958 in which our Supreme Court of Appeals
held the jury verdict to be excessive may reveal in part the reason
84 Vance v. Logan Williamson Bus Co., 131 W. Va. 296, 46 S.E.2d 783
(1948).
85 Watson v. Woodall, supra note 34. But see P. Lorillard Co. v. Clay,
127 Va. 734, 104 S.E. 384 (1920); Gulf Transport Co. v. Allen, 209 Miss. 206,
46 So. 2d436 (1950).
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for such action by the court, and an insight into the reasoning of
the court on this problem of excessiveness.
In the Brewer case, the principal reason given by the court
for reversing the verdict as excessive was that if the plaintiff invested the $93,800 awarded him at three per cent interest, he would
receive yearly an amount almost equal to his annual earnings; and
at the end of his life expectancy, if still living, he would still have
the $93,800 intact.
This is a rather common argument used by appellate courts
to justify a reversal, but query, is this a reasonable and justifiable
basis for reversing a jury verdict? Does it take into consideration
the possibility of an even higher cost of living in the future, which
is certainly more than a mere possibility based on the relentless
increase thereof in the past few years, or the possibility that the
plaintiff had he not been injured may have increased his earnings
in future years? Is proper cognizance taken of the income tax that
must be paid on the dividends of the investment, or the uncertainty
of keeping the money invested at a certain rate of return? Does the
court properly assess the medical expenses that will be incurred in
the future; the past and future element of pain and suffering; the
inconvenience of having to rely, perhaps for life, on the constant
care and attention of others for even the most basic and elementary
functions of existence? Is full awareness taken of the humiliation
and degradation suffered; of the constant mental anguish which an
injured man deprived of his right to earn a livelihood must necessarily endure due to the uncertain future, health and welfare of his
family? All of these factors and others combine to comprise that
amount of the verdict not attributed to loss of wages and past
expenses. 8 6 In the Brewer case, the jury awarded the plaintiff
approximately $30,000 to compensate him for all of these factors.
And even though the plaintiff in that case was injured to the point
of being a complete invalid, whose remaining twenty years held
naught but pain for himself and burdening pity for his family, our
court would not permit this figure, meagre though it was under
the circumstances, to be recovered. It is submitted that the figure
which the jury returned was not so excessive in view of all the facts
as to warrant a reversal.
86 For an excellent discussion of the above views see Dumphy v. Norfolk
& Western Ry., supra note 28, a case in which many of these factors were
recognized and approved; and in which case the argument set forth by the court
in the Brewer case was disapproved.
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In Vance v. Logan Williamson Bus Co.,8 7 an eighteen year old
boy, through the negligence of the defendant, had his leg broken
in three places; his ankle was smashed; he was hospitalized for four
weeks; it was painful for him to walk at the time of the trial; he
was able to do but little work on his father's farm. No doctor testified in the case. The verdict was reversed primarily because there
was no medical proof on which it could be based. The court also
said that there was too much speculation as to the permanency of
the injury. However, regardless of the actual permanency of the
injury, how much was this injury worth at the time of the trial?
What would it take to make this plaintiff whole? The jury awarded
him $8,000 which the court decided was too much. As the court
pointed out, however, a boy of eighteen is more likely to recover
from an injury than an older person with a similar injury. This
reasoning was doubtless of small comfort to the plaintiff in this case.
In Framptonv. ConsolidatedBus Lines,88 the plaintiff, a female,
suffered a deep cut on her cheek, separation of the septum of her
nose, a lumpy deformity on the bridge of her nose, and a fractured
knee. The court reversed the jury verdict saying that the condition
of the plaintiff's nose and head (headaches, colds, pain in nasal
passages) could be corrected by an operation; and because the
fractured knee would unite properly and all her scars but one would
become less noticeable or disappear. The court held the $7,500
award excessive because with the sear excepted, the "plaintiff has
received no permanent or noncorrectible injuries."
This reasoning serves to add emphasis to the general attitude
of the court, apparent from the cases noted heretofore, namely its
seemingly unwarranted restrictive review of personal injury actions
appealed on the grounds of excessiveness. It is alleged that any
pain, suffering, anxiety, loss of wages, medical expenses, etc., which
must be endured or incurred in an effort to correct these injuries
should be a proper and recognized element of damages by the jury
and the appellate court. The court, incidentally, mentioned that in
the Frampton case the first jury had awarded the plaintiff only
$4,000, but emphasized that they did not consider this fact.
A somewhat unusual case89 involving an alleged assault and
battery in which the plaintiff, proving only $49.50 actual damages,
received a jury verdict of $5,000, including $2,000 punitive damages,
87

88

Vance v. Logan Williamson Bus Co., supra note 84.

SFrampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, 134 W. Va. 815, 62 S.E.2d 126
(1950). 89tansv. Faulkner, supra note 83.
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was reversed as excessive. In spite of these facts, there was a very
vigorous dissent by Judge Haymond, with whom Judge Fox concurred. "This Court should not set aside a verdict so found simply
because its members, if sitting as jurors, would not have been willing
"
to assess [such] an amount ..
Finally, note the case of French v. Sinkford.90 The plaintiff
was an eleven year old girl. She received a severe cut on her leg;
a compound comminuted fracture of her right leg with damage
to the muscles and soft tissue. She was in the operating room for
an hour; in the hospital for nineteen days; she wore a heavy cast
from her toes to her thigh for two months and a lighter one for
a similar period. She was in bed for six weeks, on crutches at the
time of the trial. Doctors' testimony indicated that it would take
at least a year for her recovery; and none would state definitely
that there would be no permanent functional disturbance. The
young girl was being schooled as an acrobatic dancer. The court
set aside a jury verdict of $10,000 on the ground that the jury "took
a mistaken view of the case." From the facts, this conclusion is
perhaps subject to some considerable debate. Two members of
the court dissented most strenuously from this decision. 91
It should be fairly evident from this somewhat cursory examination that our court has taken a rather limited view of the province of the jury in assessing damages in those cases, and has reversed verdicts which would appear to be fair, just and no more
than adequate.
The review of each personal injury verdict in the plaintiff's
favor which comes before an appellate court imposes a serious
duty and grave responsibility on each member of that court. No
judge should ever permit himself to become so calloused by the
constant review of the impersonal printed record in commercial
transactions, or the application of ageless legal principles necessary
for a decision in a contract, sales or corporation dispute, that he
cannot examine a personal injury award with a deep sense of humility
and understanding, not only as a guardian of the law, but also as a
human being who must, if justice is to be effectuated, take full
cognizance of the true value of the body and mind of another
human being whose right to enjoy life has to some extent been
impaired through the careless action of a negligent defendant. The
90 French v. Sincford, supra note 78.
91 See also Miller v. Blue Ridge Bus Lines, 128 W. Va. 428, 15 S.E.2d
400 (1941); Snodgrass v. Charleston NuGrape Co., supra note 78.
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cold recital in a printed record or brief that the plaintiff has undergone an operation should not even be considered by a judge in
terms of compensation until he has been able to visualize the fear
and pain and suffering which was necessarily endured by the injured
party. Until this type of thought process is completed through every
phase of the plaintiffs injury and recovery to date, it is respectfully
submitted that a truly adequate and just decision cannot be made.
If the jury has been convinced, by witnessing the physical condition
of the plaintiff, and hearing the story of his painful medical and
mental efforts toward recovery, and has seen fit to award this injured human a certain sum of money, then each member of an
appellate court called upon to review such a verdict should search
his conscience in the most diligent manner before casting a vote to
reverse it.

The following quotation signifies the problem which exists
today in West Virginia, which problem must be dealt with and
overcome if just compensation is to be made in the future to those
persons who have suffered injuries through the negligence of
another:
"If as so many courts say, the question of damages is for
the jury to decide and there is no standard of measurement
for pain and suffering, it seems hardly consistent with these
premises that in the majority of cases coming before appellate
courts on the question of damages the amounts of verdicts are
found to be excessive. It is also significant to note that the
number of cases in which the courts find the amounts of verdicts inadequate is negligible.
"If appellate courts have so much respect for the decisions
of juries and trial judges ... why is it that so many decisions
in which both judge and jury are in accord are overruled by
appellate courts?... is not the appellate court acting contrary
to principle in substituting
its own opinion for those of the
92
jury and trial judge?"
"The test of a verdict should be its adequacy in compensating
the injured person for what he has suffered; not the size of the
figures involved. One must look to the injuries suffered by the
human being first; then to the amount."9 3 When this is done, then
perhaps the plaintiff will begin to receive and keep adequate awards
in West Virginia.
C. H. B., Jr.
92Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 27,
31, 34
(1955).
93
Belli, supra note 70.
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